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The Role of Emerging Donors in the Transformation of Traditional Donor 
Recipient Relationships: The Case of China in Myanmar 
 
Yasutami Shimomura* 
 
Abstract 
The aid recipients have suffered from bargaining power inequality under traditional 
donor-recipient relationship. This article explores how an aid recipient could overcome their 
position through leveraging the role of emerging donors, or non-traditional providers. This 
article illustrates the two stages of transformation in the traditional donor-recipient relationship, 
through the standard theories of rational choice and an in-depth case study. 
One of the recipients’ objectives is to maximize the amount of financial inflows. Financial 
flows, in particular aid, is assured as far as the recipient conforms to the prevailing 
development norm, which is usually expressed by the OECD-DAC members as a set of aid 
conditionality, economic and political. The recipient has the two courses of action: to conform 
or not conform to the norm. If a recipient does not conform, as a matter of principle, aid could 
be suspended and other financial flows, such as foreign direct investment (FDI), would not be 
available under the economic sanction. However, the recipient can secure financial flows from 
the emerging donors, who tend to be indifferent to the norm. 
Once the financial flows from the emerging donors is secured, the next task for a recipient is to 
improve their position, more precisely to increase financial inflows, introducing the traditional 
donors’ flows. One realistic solution is mutual concession; the recipient agrees a part of the 
norm, and the traditional donors resume a part of financial flows, maintaining its own principle 
as far as possible. This could be attained if the traditional donors regard the recipient’s market 
and/or natural resources attractive. The traditional donors might be concerned about the 
emerging donor’s monopolistic position in the recipient market/resources, and look for their 
shares. The aid recipient and the traditional donors could explore mutual concessions; both 
sides can improve their position by partial acceptance of the other’s principle. 
This was exactly what occurred in Myanmar where China has played a pivotal role. The 
in-depth case study of Myanmar illustrates how a recipient could overcome the bargaining 
power asymmetry through leveraging the emerging donors. It is desirable that other developing 
countries draw hints from the Myanmar’s experience and enhance their bargaining power in 
the asymmetric donor-recipient relationship. 
 
Keywords: donor recipient relationship, course of action, outcome, leverage, emerging donors 
                                            
* Professor Emeritus at Hosei University (y-shimomura@movie.ocn.ne.jp). 
 
This paper has been prepared as part of a JICA Research Institute project entitled “Development 
Cooperation by Emerging Countries.” 
 2 
 
1. Introduction: Power Inequality in Traditional Donor （DAC Donor） Recipient 
Relationships 
This article explores how an aid recipient country could improve its position in traditional donor 
（DAC1 donor） recipient relationship by leveraging emerging donors. For this purpose, we 
adopt the case of Myanmar and analyze the country’s choices in search of preferable outcomes. 
 
One notable feature of traditional donor recipient relationships is bargaining power 
inequality between the provider and the receiver of “development cooperation,” defined as the 
total flows of financial flows to developing countries. This paper focuses the attention on public 
flows and foreign direct investment, in particular. 
As is shown in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 2005, traditional 
donors have repeatedly stated that they respect the leadership of their partner (recipient) country. 
However, there is a large gap between rhetoric and reality. While a developing country’s 
leadership is respected theoretically, their policy choices should be in compatible with the 
recommendation of the international aid community that is composed of the OECD-DAC 
members and the World Bank; otherwise, major donors could suspend their aid commitment and 
the flow of private investments could also be affected. This is particularly so in the cases of 
small/ordinary recipients who lack “strategic influences.” While the traditional donor recipient 
relationship had been unequal, the aid recipient’s bargaining power has deteriorated as a result of 
the following three initiatives taken by the donor community between the 1980s and 2000s.  
The first was the launch of structural adjustment lending (SAL) by the World Bank in 
1979. SAL is defined as “rapidly disbursing, policy-based lending,” with the objective of 
removing the “most important distortions that hinder the allocation of resource and limit growth” 
(Corbo and Fischer 1991: 1, 7, 16). This implied the World Bank’s shift from project aid to 
                                            
1 The OECD set up the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1961 in order to secure a 
sufficient volume of resources for development cooperation activities and improve effectiveness. Today, 
the overarching goal is to promote the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). There are 30 members 
as of October 2019. 
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policy-based program aid2 (Nissanke 2006: 2). An essential feature of SAL is the introduction of 
“conditionality” to the World Bank operation. Conditionality was originated by the IMF in 1952, 
as the “set of policies that governs the use of Fund resources” so as “to ensure the efficiency of 
the adjustment process” (Guitian 1980). The instrument was replicated by the World Bank’s 
SAL. “Conditionality was justified on the grounds that donors should actively influence the 
policy and conduct of recipient countries through aid leverage” (Nissanke 2006: 2). To put it 
another way, conditionality further strengthened donor’s position and, as a result, escalated 
asymmetric aspects of the donor recipient relationship.  
The second was the expansion of the coverage of conditionality from economic to 
noneconomic policy agenda, in particular democracy, human rights, and good governance. The 
turning point was the end of the cold war. In 1990, the OECD-DAC High-Level Meeting 
announced, “DAC members reaffirm their conviction that there is a vital connection between 
open, democratic and accountable political systems, individual rights and the effective and 
equitable operation of economic systems with substantial reductions in poverty” (OECD 1991: 
43). Based on this conviction, the aid community aggressively began to link aid giving with 
political reform. This was the surge of de facto “political conditionality,” which further 
accelerated power inequality, as the recipients fully recognize that aid will not be provided if 
they do not follow the aid community’s political norms. 
The third was the increasing emphasis on “harmonizing aid policies and operational 
procedures,” the purpose of which was to reduce transaction costs and enhance aid effectiveness 
(Koeberle et al 2006:22). More specifically, it was intended to prevent “fungibility,” or the use of 
the aid in ways contradictory to original goal. This movement reflects donors’ concerns that aid 
will be allocated to areas the donors want to support. The final outcome of this movement was 
the “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” that was adopted at the OECD-DAC High Level 
                                            
2 “Policy-based lending” provides resources based on a set of policies or institutional reforms. “Program 
aid” refers to coordinated donor support for a comprehensive program or a specific sector/thematic 
strategy (Koeberle, Stavreski, and Walliser 2006: 6). 
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Forum in 2005 in order to reaffirm the commitments to harmonize donors’ actions (OECD 2005). 
Under aid harmonization, a shift from bilateral to collective bargaining occurred; while the 
former is an agreement between a single recipient and a single donor, the latter is one between a 
recipient and a group of concerted donors. The shift could reduce recipient’s bargaining power, 
as aid coordination furnishes donors with more leverage. It should be admitted, under the above 
circumstance, the aid community have repeatedly stressed “ownership,” or the principle that 
recipients “exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and 
co-ordinate development actions” while donors respect recipient leadership (OECD 2005). It 
was repeatedly stressed that a recipient is in the driver’s seat. This could be desirable for 
preventing worsening power inequalities. However, we should keep in mind E. H. Carr’s point 
that “Theories of international morality are … the product of dominant nations” (Carr 2001: 74). 
His view leads to one fundamental question: is the emphasis of ownership rhetoric or reality? 
Although the answer might be different from one case to another, there is one simple test to 
examine which is true. If a recipient in the driver’s seat can choose, without any penalty, a path 
that is not in accordance with the aid community’s advice, then ownership is retained in the 
hands of the driver; otherwise, the driving path is controlled by somebody else from outside. 
 
Although it is not easy for an aid recipient to overcome their unfavorable position, 
inequality could be reduced by introducing measures that balance the power of traditional 
donors. An aid recipient can leverage the role of emerging donors for this purpose. This is what 
occurred in Myanmar, where China played a pivotal role. 
The case of Myanmar was chosen because of China’s active role leveraging against the 
traditional donors. However, doubt can be raised about the choice, as Myanmar’s military junta 
had been labelled “the most brutal regime in the world” (International Herald Tribune March 17, 
2000), and China has been frequently called as a “rogue donor.” Although we should pay due 
attention to moral and value judgement, it’s important to note our objective is purely practical: to 
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draw lessons about what is useful in the real world. From such a realist perspective, the art of 
diplomacy of Metternich and Talleyrand have commanded professional as well as academic 
attention, because they are full of explicit and tacit wisdom, although their approach lacked 
credibility and integrity. Similarly, the case of Myanmar offers ample lessons, as public 
intellectual assets in the developing world, for many aid recipients who suffer from a power 
imbalance with traditional donors. The author wishes to stress that Myanmar, which used to be 
rejected by the international aid community, began to pursue the removal of sanctions after 
obtaining a large amount of aid from China, and at last attained it substantially.  
 
2. Analytical Framework 
2.1 The Nature of aid recipient’s decision making  
An aid recipient is supposed to choose a course of action from a set of alternatives in order to 
solve a problem. The primary purpose of this section is to provide an analytical framework to 
examine such decision making, based on the standard theories of rational choice approach. For 
each course of action, there is a specific outcome. The objective of an aid recipient’s decision is 
to optimize the outcome, or the results of a chosen course of action. While every actor has 
preference over the set of outcomes, it is assumed that the aid recipient’s preference is “to 
maximize the amount of financial inflows, in so far as the attached conditions are acceptable.” It 
should be noted, however, that there are variables that an aid recipient cannot control: an 
uncontrollable variable. One important uncontrollable variable for an aid recipient is the aid 
community’s development norms, or a set of the traditional donors’ principles. The outcome of 
each course of action is influenced by how the course of action conforms to the prevailing 
development norm, as aid is assured if the recipient conforms to the norm. Private financial 
flows are also often influenced by the aid flows availability, as shown in the cases of Vietnam 
and Myanmar during the period of international sanctions. The development norm is usually 
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expressed as a set of aid conditions, both economic and political. This paper assumes a 
traditional donor gives aid unless a recipient is politically or economically unattractive, or if they 
do not conform with the development norm. This paper adopts the above simple concept of the 
traditional donors’ preference, because it is not possible to know their real motives. The long 
history of the disputes over why is aid given shows that it is a controversial and elusive issue. 
Serving national interest inevitably lays behind the aid philosophy of humanitarian principle or 
commitment to the international public goods; the two types of motives work together, and are 
not separable (Lancaster 2007: 6). In the same way, the paper assumes that the emerging donors 
provide financial flows, as far as the recipient is regarded to be politically and/or economically 
worthy; they are usually indifferent to a recipient’s conformity with the prevailing development 
norm.  
The above explanation of the nature of aid recipient’s decision making can be 
represented in the equation: 
 
O = f (A, B)                        (1) 
where: O is the level of outcome, i.e. the total amount of financial inflows 
      A is the selected course of action 
      B is the degree of conformity to the development norm 
 
2.2 Courses of action and the outcomes: the first stage 
2.2.1 
To start with, let us assume the simplest case of the relationship between an aid recipient and a 
single traditional donor or a single group of traditional donors. The recipient has two courses of 
actions: “to conform or not to conform to the development norm” of the aid community. If they 
conform, aid would be provided as usual, and other forms of financial flows such as foreign 
direct investment would be secured on the basis of business as usual. In this paper, as was stated 
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in the Introduction, the total amount of financial flows to developing countries is termed 
development cooperation.  
 
The “outcome” is represented as the combination of “F”, i.e. the financial inflow and 
“d”, i.e. a recipient’s stance on the prevailing development norm: 
 
  The outcome: [Ft,d1]  
  where: Ft is the traditional donors’ financial flows to the recipient 
        d1 means being in conformity with the development norm 
 
However, if a recipient does not conform, aid would be suspended, and there would be 
no other financial inflows, as is illustrated in the experiences of Vietnam and Myanmar during 
the era of sanctions. 
  
  The outcome: [Ft, d0] = zero 
  where: “d0, zero” means being not in conformity with the development norm 
  
In reality, however, there are other providers than the traditional donors, such as 
emerging donors, who are not members of the aid community. As the emerging donors seem to 
be basically indifferent to the development norm, their aid as well as other forms of financial 
flows will not be influenced by the recipients’ choices of action. 
 
In other words, [Fe, d1] = [Fe, d0] 
where: Fe is the financial flows from emerging donors 
 
The resulting outcomes are shown in Figures 1 and 2. The four outcomes in the matrix of 
Figure 2 represent different amounts of financial inflows. The largest number ([Ft, d1] + Fe) 
represents the flows from all the donors, traditional as well as emerging. The second largest one 
[Ft, d1] represents the flow from the traditional donors alone, the third ([Ft, d0] + Fe) represents 
emerging donors’ alone, and the last one ([Ft, d0] under the condition that any emerging donors 
do not provide financial flows (“without emerging donors’ financial flows”) is nil. Theoretically, 
all of these four outcomes are ordered as follows: 
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   ([Ft, d1]+ Fe) > [Ft, d1] > ([Ft, d0] + Fe) > ([Ft, d0]            (2) 
or 
([Ft, d1] + Fe) > [Ft, d1] > (Fe) > 0                            (2’) 
                                                                            
where: Ft is traditional donors’ financial flows 
   d1 is being in conformity with the development norm 
   d0 is being not in conformity with the development norm 
   Fe is emerging donors’ financial flows, and [Fe, d1] = [Fe, d0] 
 
If an aid recipient is not willing to conform to the development norm as a matter of 
principle, only one outcome, [Ft, d0] is available; there is no financial flows to the recipient. 
However, the outcome would be improved to ([Ft, d0] + Fe) under the condition of “with 
emerging donors’ financial flows”; there would be financial flows in the amount of Fe. The 
emerging donors’ contribution to the outcomes’ improvement can be expressed as: ([Ft, d0] + 
Fe) － [Ft, d0] = Fe. The larger the emerging donors’ financial flows to the recipient, the larger 
their contribution to the improvement.  
 
2.2.2 
This was what occurred in Myanmar around 1990, as is shown in section 3.1. Myanmar’s 
available courses of action were to either conform or not to the development norm. Conforming 
would not cause any changes in the traditional donor recipient relationship. In contrast, not 
conforming was expected to provoke the refusal of aid or the application of economic sanction; 
this put Myanmar in a difficult position. Being faced with donors’ decision not to provide aid, 
Myanmar might choose to suffer from sanctions without any major financial inflows. The more 
preferable alternative was to secure emerging donors’ finance, in particular China’s foreign aid. 
The outcome is labeled Fe.  
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2.3 Courses of action and the outcomes: the second stage 
2.3.1 
The initial condition for an aid recipient at the beginning of the second stage is equal to the first 
stage outcome: Fe. In this second stage, the recipient’s task is to explore any chance of 
improvement. With financial flows from the emerging donors secured, the next step is to acquire 
financial flows from traditional donors. Since the aid community requires adherence to the 
development norm there are two options logically for a recipient. One is to change their mind so 
as to conform to the norm completely; the outcome is ([Ft, d1] + Fe). From purely financial 
viewpoint, the outcome ([Ft, d1] + Fe) is larger than the other including the initial condition (Fe). 
From a political standpoint, however, this is not considered an acceptable option for the 
recipient.  
The other choice is to explore mutual concessions; the expected result is that the aid 
community lowers the hurdle for resuming their aid at least partially, and the recipient conforms 
to “a part of” the norm.  
 
The outcome of this decision, if realized, is represented: ([Ftx, dx] + Fe) 
where: dx (0 < x < 1) means the acceptance of a part of the development norm 
 
The outcome is also preferable to the initial condition, as ([Ftx, dx] + Fe) > Fe; the larger 
x, the larger [Ftx, dx]. Are mutual concessions worth considering for the traditional donors? In 
view of the traditional donors, the initial condition of the second stage is emerging donors’ 
domination of financial flows to the recipient. To put it another way, emerging donors are in the 
monopoly position and fully enjoy the sole access to the recipient’s market and natural resources, 
as trade activities are usually accompanied by financial flows. There seems to be a good reason 
for the traditional donors to be concerned about their lack of access, particularly if the market is 
promising and natural resources are rich. The traditional donors’ fear of the emerging donors’ 
dominant status could finally lead traditional donors to reconsider their strategy and make a 
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concession. Mutual concessions could provide them a certain degree of access to the market and 
natural resources.  
As the size of financial flows indicates the size of providers’ economic activities in the 
recipient’s market, and the available share in that market, the following equation (3) is drawn: 
 
  Mte ([Ft, d1]+ Fe) > Me ([Ft, d0] + Fe)         (3) 
  where: Mte and Me indicate the traditional donors’ market shares under the 
conditions of [with the financial flows of traditional and emerging donors] and 
[without the traditional donors’ financial flows]                                                                      
 
It should be noted that the two variables in the equation (3) are the proxy variables of the 
traditional donors’ economic activities in the recipient’s market. The traditional donors’ concern 
comes from the gap between Mte and Me, i.e. no financial outflows from them and, as a result, 
no market access for them. They may recognize that the financial flows Mx ([Ftx, dx] + Fe) 
under the mutual concessions will lead to better market access for them and improve their 
position. Certainly, the expected size of market Mx ([Ftx, dx] + Fe) will be bigger than Me ([Ft, 
d0] + Fe) in the initial condition.  
The new opportunity for mutual concession is considered to be a contribution of or gift 
from the emerging donors, as the temptation to think about concessions results from the 
emerging donors’ dominant position in the recipient’s territory. 
 
2.3.2 
The recipient has two options at the beginning of the second stage. The first choice to conform to 
the development norm leads to the largest outcome of financial flows ([Ft, d1] + Fe) for the 
recipient, and in addition, the largest market size Mte for the traditional donors. The second 
option of proposing mutual concessions, could, if accepted, improve the positions of both actors, 
compared to the initial condition, realizing the financial inflows ([Ftx, dx] + Fe) and the 
traditional donors’ market size Mx. If the proposal is rejected, the outcome will be equal to the 
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initial condition of the second stage. It should be noted that in both cases there is no deterioration 
in the recipient’s position, as the initial level of financial flows are secured. The recipient’s 
bargaining power had been enhanced in comparison with the beginning of the first stage, or at 
the time of the start of sanction. 
 
The recipient’s decision to either conform or not conform or to propose or not propose 
concession is inevitably influenced by domestic politics. The analysis of domestic politics 
should be introduced, particularly in the case studies. Unfortunately, it is often impossible for us 
to acquire a sufficient amount of reliable information about power relations among the political 
leaders in the developing countries, particular in the authoritarian ones such as Myanmar. 
 
2.4 Summary 
The above study of the two stages show how emerging donors can improve the recipient’s 
bargaining power vis-a-vis traditional donors of the aid community. In the first stage, they can 
provide a financial safety net. In the second stage, a recipient can explore mutual concessions, 
taking advantage of the traditional donors’ concern about the emerging donors’ dominant 
position in the recipient market. 
We will move to the detailed case study of Myanmar in the period between the late 
1980s and the late 2000s. It will reveal that the above analytical framework can explain 
effectively what occurred in Myanmar. 
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3. Case Study of Myanmar 
3.1 First Stage: Economic sanctions and China’s path to a dominant position 
In the late 1980s, the “Burmese way to socialism” had almost collapsed after a quarter century 
stagnation. A series of public demonstrations against the Ne Win regime denounced the 
deterioration of living conditions particularly due to high inflation3 and the shortage of rice. 
Being concerned at the political turmoil, a group of army officers established the State Law and 
Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and took power in a coup in September 1988 (World Bank 
1995: 1-2; Myat Thein 2004: 5-6). The SLORC regime announced an extensive economic 
reform program called the “Open-Door” program in late 1988. The reform endeavor was highly 
evaluated by the aid community and foreign investors, as it emphasized (a) improving 
production incentives, (b) liberalizing investment policy, (c) promoting the private sector, (d) 
reforming the state enterprise sector, and (e) liberalizing exchange rate and trade policies (World 
Bank 1995: 1-4; IMF 1997: 5-6).  
In the meantime, the military junta crashed anti-military rule demonstrations and 
repressed the opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), dismissing the 
NLD’s landslide victory in the 1990 election, in which the NLD gained over 60 percent of the 
vote under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi (Taylor 2004: 172). Moreover, the SLORC broke 
their repeated pledge that power would be transferred to an elected government once the new 
constitution is established (Wingfield 2000: 203-205). 
 
Expressing concern over the unstable political conditions and military coup, the Japanese 
government, by far the largest donor for Myanmar in the 1980s, suspended aid in principle 
(MOFA 1992: 32). Japan’s ODA commitment to Myanmar suddenly dropped as a result from 
                                            
3 The annual average rate of inflation in the period of 1986-1988 was 17.4 percent (Myat Thein, 2004: 
66). 
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290.0 million to 3.8 million US dollars between 1987 and 1989; the OECD-DAC members’ total 
ODA commitment also decreased from 399.6 to 17.2 million US dollars between 1987 and 1989 
(OECD 1992: 201, see Table 1). Although the amount of ODA commitment from the aid 
community slightly recovered in the following years, the ODA was limited to a small amount of 
UNDP grants and debt relief from Japan (World Bank 1995: 12). In the absence of substantial 
new ODA flows, Myanmar began to increasingly depend on foreign direct investment and 
suppliers’ credit from neighboring countries (World Bank 1995: 12, IMF 1997: 34). In this most 
critical period, the financial flows from China began to fill the vacuum. 
Although it is difficult to have a reliable time series data of China’s foreign aid to 
Myanmar, we can estimate the trend through the analysis of the changes in Myanmar’s imports 
from China, as most of Myanmar’s imports had been financed by foreign sources. According to 
Toshihiro Kudo, around 60 percent of Myanmar’s imports in 1988 had been from four major 
donors: Japan, UK, Germany, and US. However, the picture was drastically changed by 1990. 
China suddenly appeared as the largest exporter to Myanmar; in contrast, the share of Japan, by 
far the largest exporter to Myanmar in 1988, was reduced by half (Kudo 2012: 90). The fact that 
China jumped to the largest exporter replacing Japan is accompanied by the sudden increase of 
China’s financial flows to Myanmar. 
Meanwhile, China began to construct various infrastructure projects and industrial 
estates in Myanmar, following traditional donors’ sanctions. In November 1989, Myanmar and 
China signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement in which China agreed to offer 
an interest free loan of RMB 50 million (15 million US dollar) for the Rangoon-Thanhyin rail 
and road bridge construction project. (Poon 2002). Although Myanmar had to suffer from 
international isolation, China began to acquire a dominant position in Myanmar and effectively 
absorbed the shock of economic sanctions. 
China’s contribution is shown as the difference between ([Ft, d0] + Fe) and [Ft, d0] in 
the equation (2), where Fe is emerging donors’ financial flows, Ft is traditional donors’ financial 
 14 
 
flows, and d0 is being not in conformity with the development norm. Statistics show that the net 
long-term capital inflow, or [Ft, d0] had been persistently negative in the 1990s Myanmar (IMF 
1997: 99). Therefore, China’s role, represented by Fe, was vital.  
 
3.2 Intermezzo: Longstanding stalemate 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, there was no notable progress on the talks between the army 
leadership and the NLD. The junta placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest in 1988, 
released her in 1995, and arrested again in 2000 after her attempt to make trips outside Yangon to 
meet NLD supporters. Again in 2003, she was placed under her third house arrest, after her 
release in 2002, a political see-saw game. 
Meanwhile, there were various international attempts to end the deadlock between the 
military junta and the NLD. It is said Japan played a crucial behind-the-scenes role in 
negotiating the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in 1995 (Wingfield 2000: 211). 
Although Japanese foreign policy in Myanmar had been basically low-key, as usual, after the 
start of sanctions, William Burnes, an experienced “Burma watcher,” pointed out that “Japan’s 
sentimental attachment to Burma dating back to the second world war” could explain why Japan 
advised the military regime “to ease its iron grip on the country sufficiently to permit Japan to 
helping it” (Financial Times, December 15, 1999). Japan’s “sentimental attachment” seemingly 
motivated a series of “under the surface” support to Myanmar and contributed to the gradual 
shift to the second stage. Some ASEAN members who were oriented towards regional solidarity 
also behaved same way. In November 1999, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi held talks with Than 
Shwe, the military junta leader, during the ASEAN summit in Manila, and Ryutaro Hashimoto, 
Obuchi’s predecessor, made a four-day unofficial visit to Myanmar and reportedly criticized the 
hard-liner stance of the United States and Europe (Wingfield 2000: 211). In 1999, the United 
Nations special envoy, Alvaro de Soto, met with Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and Aung San Suu 
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Kyi (Wingfield 2000: 210). Although there was no significant progress as a result of these 
attempts, Ismail Razali, de Soto’s successor and a Malaysian diplomat, achieved the release of 
Aung San Suu Kyi in May 2002, after a series of patient negotiation, in cooperation with Prime 
Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia. Mahathir himself also visited Myanmar being 
accompanied by the mission of three hundred businessmen and urged Than Shwe to accelerate 
the transition to democracy (International Herald Tribune, May 6, 2002; Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 
August 19, 2002). All in all, international initiatives that aimed to end the stalemate did not lead 
to significant fruits (Wingfield 2000: 203).  
 
“Western governments, led by the United States, have been fit progressively to increase 
the levels of economic sanction based on the belief that this will result in economic collapse, and 
eventual fall of the regime” (Taylor 2004: 171). But the expectations were not realized. In 
response to the third house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, the U.S. government together with the 
European Union (EU) introduced draconian sanctions, with a complete ban on trade, new 
investment, and all commercial transactions since the end of July 2003. However, “there seemed 
little more the Western governments can do to force political change in Myanmar” (Taylor 2004: 
171, 179). Also, another side of reality was pointed out: “Although the American government 
has prohibited new investment in Myanmar since 1997, the United States remains one of 
Myanmar’s five major trade partners,” as Myanmar’s exports to the US are “primarily textiles 
made in Asian-owned factories outside Yangon.” (Kurlantzick 2002). 
 
Myanmar under siege could rely on the following two lifelines. First, China, together 
with other neighbors of Myanmar, such as India, Malaysia, and Thailand, pursued a contrary 
policy. Chinese leaders regularly visited Myanmar with the fresh commitment of financial 
support, as they fully recognized Myanmar’s strategic importance as a westbound “land bridge” 
to the Indian Ocean and the West (Poon 2002); from China’s security view point, maintaining a 
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dominant position in Myanmar was invaluable. In response, Than Shwe made a state visit to 
China in 2003 (Taylor 2004: 179). Second, foreign investors were attracted by Myanmar’s 
remarkable business opportunities that resulted from the extensive economic reform program 
under the military junta. The statistics show the fact that Myanmar’s capital account had been 
basically in surplus during the 1990s, except in the post-Asian financial crisis era, owing to the 
foreign direct investment flows, which effectively made up for the reduction in long-term aid 
flows (IMF 1997: 99). The five largest investors have been three neighboring countries, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, and two in Europe, France and UK (IMF 1997: 110;, Myat 
Thein 2004: 165, 252). 
 
3.3 Second Stage 
In spite of economic sanctions, Myanmar achieved 7percent of annual GDP growth rate during 
the 1990s 4  (World Bank 2010: 226), a much higher rate than the average of low- and 
middle-income countries in the world. However, there was apparently a lot of room for 
improvement. Taking into account the fact that the aid flows to Myanmar from the OECD-DAC 
member countries had been limited to small amount of grant aid (Table 3), the macroeconomic 
performance and level of welfare could be much improved if ODA loans had been available. 
Thinking in accordance with the equation (2), the envisaged improvement is the shift from ([Ft, 
d0] + Fe) to ([Ft, d1] + Fe), where Ft is traditional donors’ financial flows, Fe is emerging donors’ 
financial flows, d0 indicates not conforming with the development norm, and d1 indicates being 
in conformity with the development norm.  
As a matter of fact, this shift was what occurred in Vietnam in the 1990s. In contrast to 
Myanmar, Vietnam had enjoyed sizable aid flows during that period (Table 3). The experience of 
Vietnam was a good reference case for Myanmar in the 2000s, as both countries had been 
                                            
4 On the other hand, the annual rate of growth of per capita consumption was only 0.9 percent (Myat 
Than 2004: 127). Myanmar could not realize shared growth. 
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similarly ousted from the mainstream foreign aid flows around 19905. The Myanmar strongmen 
could easily recognize the fact that, unlike Vietnam, Myanmar did not take advantage of its 
proximity to the dynamic production network in the Indochina peninsula. The recovery of a 
normal relationship with the international aid community will also pave the way to the full 
integration into the regional value chain. 
Certainly, following the path of Vietnam was a highly sensitive issue for Myanmar’s 
leaders, as this would require their acceptance of the international development norm, which 
they persistently dismissed. Worse, the relationship with the international aid community further 
deteriorated after 2007 because of the bloody suppression of large-scale protests led by Buddhist 
monks (MOFA 2010: 95). However, concessions, or the acceptance of a part of the requirements 
of the international aid community, could not be unthinkable. The outcome of this alternative, 
represented with ([Ftx, dx] + Fe), where dx (0 < x < 1), means being in partial conformity with 
the development norm. Apparently, the newly available outcome was an attractive option, as 
([Ftx, dx] + Fe) > ([Ft, d0] + Fe). 
 
In the meantime, the traditional donors were also in search of new policy direction, as it 
had been recognized that the sustained economic sanctions deprived them of access to one of the 
most promising markets and furnished China with a dominant position there. China’s aggressive 
penetration into Myanmar is illustrated in the list of China’s projects (Table 2). The lost 
opportunity for other donors was remarkable, taking into consideration Myanmar’s large 
population of 50 million, rich natural resources including oil and natural gas, and its strategic 
location as the gate to the Indian Ocean, shortcutting the clumsy shipping route of Malacca strait. 
As shown in the equation (3) of 2.3.1, Mte that is the size of market under ([Ft, dx] + Fe) is 
desirable from the viewpoint of traditional donors too, because their position during the era of 
intermezzo is “zero access.” Even the idea of mutual concessions could lead to a bigger payoff 
                                            
5 The aid for Vietnam had been banned since the Cambodia invasion in 1978. 
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than the status quo for traditional donors, as the expected size of market Mx, where dx (0 < x < 1), 
under the condition of ([Ftx, dx] + Fe) is bigger than Me under the status quo. However, the 
traditional donors’ path of concessions needs to be carefully designed so as not to enhance the 
legitimacy of the military junta. Under these circumstances, a small step toward political reform 
by Myanmar’s leaders could be regarded by the international community as a suitable reason to 
begin the talk of concessions. 
 
As we have reviewed, both Myanmar and the traditional donors were tempted to 
compromise in the late 2000s. As a result, scene changes occurred slowly but persistently. Just 
after the violent crackdown of the monk-led uprising, Aung San Suu Kyi reportedly stated that 
she was “ready and willing to engage” with the generals “in a meaningful dialogue in the 
country’s future” (Financial Times, November 9, 2007), and her spokesman confirmed that she 
“felt the ruling generals had changed their attitude towards political reform” (Financial Times, 
November 11, 2007). In the west, the shift from sanctions to engagement was explored for the 
two reasons. First, it was recognized that a decade of sanctions and regime-isolation had not 
worked and pushed Myanmar “into the less scrupulous arms of China” (Financial Times, 
November 9, 2009). Second, it was pointed out that the sanctions did not affect military leaders; 
instead, their far more serious impact was on the population (Financial Times, November 10, 
2009). Arguably based on such consideration, Hillary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State, said on 
September 24, 2009 that Washington would begin “engaging directly” with the military leaders 
(Nippon Keizai Shinbun, September 27, 2009; Time, October 19, 2009). Reflecting the change of 
tide, it was reported that the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank were considering 
“possible future analytical work that could have a positive development impact for the people” 
(Financial Times, January 29, 2010). Finally, Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest 
on November 13, 2010, and the long-delayed election finally took place in the same month. 
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In March 2011, there was a change in the political leader in Myanmar from the 
hard-liner Than Shwe to the new president Thein Sein, a former SPDC, State Peace and 
Development Council core member  (MOFA 2011: 89). This was the turning point of the 
donor-recipient relationship in Myanmar. Although he had been regarded as Than Shwe’s 
“lieutenant” or a “hard-line loyalist” (TIME, October 19, 2009), Thein Sein unexpectedly began 
to signal a departure from the past. The release of more than six thousand political prisoners in 
January 2012 was regarded as one of the gestures of democratization. In response, the Obama 
administration appointed Derek Mitchel as special envoy to Myanmar. After visiting Myanmar, 
Mitchel stated, “If they take steps, we will take steps to demonstrate that we are supportive of the 
path to reform” (The New York Times, October 6, 2011). Following the Obama administration’s 
shift to encouraging “startling political changes” in Myanmar, political leaders of the 
OECD-DAC members, including Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State; Koichiro Genba, 
Japanese Foreign Minister; Alain Juppe, French Foreign Minister; and David Cameron, British 
Prime Minister visited Myanmar one after another between November 2011 and April 2012. The 
epoch-making events were the two visits of President Obama in November 2012 and November 
2014, in spite of divided opinions in the United States (The New York Times, November 10, 2014, 
Financial Times, November 11, 2014). Japan, once Myanmar’s largest donor, announced 
reopening of aid in April 2012, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe committed to a new aid package 
in the amount of 91 billion yen (more than 800 million US dollars), at the time of his visit 
(MOFA 2013: 82). Japan’s action was the departure point to full-scale aid by the international 
aid community. The attitude of traditional donors was drastically changed although the 
democratization in Myanmar was still quite limited; they attached importance to the direction of 
movement. 
 
This section has analyzed how Myanmar achieved mutual concessions, taking 
advantage of the traditional donors’ fear of China’s monopoly position. 
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There is an alternative explanation: the learning process. As early as 2007, Gideon 
Rachman, a notable international affairs expert, claimed the sanctions against Myanmar “would 
probably achieve nothing, and be actively damaging in the long term” (Financial Times, October 
2, 2001), reflecting the “sanction fatigue” in the international community. Two years later, 
Hillary Clinton told at the United Nation General Assembly, “years of sanction had not worked” 
and hinted at a shift to engagement (Financial Times, October 8, 2009). Apparently, traditional 
donors had drawn lessons from their experiences over time and did not flatly reject Myanmar’s 
proposal. 
Domestic politics in Myanmar might effectively explain their movement of mutual 
concessions. Unfortunately, there is not enough reliable information on the power relations 
among the generals. Without tangible evidence, we can only guess at the role of domestic 
politics in these shifts.  
 
3.4 Beginning of the third stage? 
Meanwhile, Myanmar’s leaders gradually started to lessen their dependence on China. In 
September 2011, Thein Sein suddenly and unexpectedly halted the construction of the Mytsone 
dam in the northern Myanmar; the 3.6 billion US dollar dam was strongly backed by China and 
regarded as a symbol of the Sino-Myanmar relationship (The New York Times, October 6, 2011; 
Asahi Shinbun, August 20, 2014). The decision, which was made despite China’s strongly 
negative response, was highly appreciated by the US government (Chen 2014). Myanmar’s new 
movement could be interpreted as an attempt to leverage the international aid community against 
China to reduce dependence on the latter. Myanmar’s leaders’ new attitude toward China might 
look for further transformation of the donor recipient relationship, by their new attitude towards 
China. 
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There is, however, uncertainty as a result of the de facto head of government Aung San 
Suu Kyi’s loss of influence following her disappointing record of political and economic reform, 
and, more importantly, the Rohingya crisis, which has significantly eroded her reputation in the 
international community. As Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership is based, to a large extent, on her 
international fame, the recent change may reduce her bargaining power vis a vis donors, and in 
particular China. Recent developments in Myanmar’s diplomatic policy suggest that Aung San 
Suu Kyi may be beginning to move closer to China.6 For example, she was invited by Chinese 
Chairman Xi Jinling to make a keynote speech in the second Belt and Road Forum in 2019. This 
certainly shows Aung San Suu Kyi’s new engagement with China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) (The Global New Light of Myanmar, February 19, 2019). While it is not yet certain 
whether the Third Stage has been halted, and it is too early to have a clear prospect, we should 
carefully watch the progress of recent changes.  
  
4. Some policy implications 
Developing countries have suffered from power inequality, over the long-term, in their 
donor-recipient relationships. This paper examined, through a rational choice approach and the 
detailed case study of Myanmar, how aid recipients can overcome power inequalities by 
leveraging emerging donors. It should be stressed that their attempt could ultimately reduce the 
influences of both traditional and emerging donors, as is hinted in the potential third stage in the 
case study. In other words, the role of emerging donors could reduce the recipient’s dependence 
on not only the traditional but also emerging donors. This could be a path to recipient’s stronger 
ownership. 
                                            
6 The author would like to express gratitude to the reviewer’s valuable suggestion on the following 
points. 
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Developing countries should take a lesson from the case of Myanmar and try to replicate 
the experience, carefully taking into account their specific contexts in order to overcome 
asymmetric donor-recipient relationships. 
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(Figure 1) Courses of action and the outcomes without emerging donors' 
 financial flows      
        
   financial flows from    
      traditional donors    
          
Courses of action in         Ft, d1     
  conformity                 (attitude to the          
development norm)         
  not in         Ft, d0     
  conformity        
           
        
(Note) Ft ,d0 = 0        
        
prepared by the author      
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(Figure 2) Courses of action and the outcomes with emerging donors 
        
    financial flows from   
      traditional donors    emerging donors  
           
Courses of action in        Ft, d1        Fe, d1   
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(attitude to the            
development norm)          
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        (Note) Ft, d0 = 0       
 Fe, d1 = Fe, d0      prepared by the author       
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(Table 1)  ODA commitment to Myanmar by the OECD-DAC members 
        
          (million US dollars)  
  Japan Germany U.S. DAC total     
1985 204.0  15.9  16.8  275.5      1986 280.4  14.7  16.2  364.6      1987 290.0  74.2  16.5  399.6      1988 69.5  4.4  10.7  117.0      1989 3.8  1.3  0.1  17.2      1990 27.4  1.1          nil 32.5      1991 27.4  0.3          nil 29.4      1992 36.8  0.5          nil 42.8      
        
(Source) OECD various issues       
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(Table 2) China-funded major projects                       
        Estimated cost             
Sector   Project       (billion US dollars) Institute in charge     Notes     
Railway  Kunming-Kyaukpyu railway              
                              
Port  Kyaukpyu    7.3  CITIC Group Cor.       
                              
Industrial estate Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone 2.7  CITIC Group Corp.       
                              
Energy  Oil & natural gas onshore     CNPC        
   ditto  offshore     ditto        
                    
   Kyaukpyu-Yunnan oil pipeline  1.5  China Development Bank      
                    
   Oil & natral fgas onshore     NPCC        
                              
Mining  Tagaung Taung nickel   0.8  China Nonferrous Metal Mining Co. 22 thousand tons  
                              
Dam and   Paung Laung      Sinohydro    280MW Sittang River 
 hydro power                  
   Depandsai       ditto        
                    
   Tarpein 1       ditto    240MW Tarpein River 
                    
   Tarpein 2       ditto    168MW ditto  
                    
   Yeywa    0.2  China EXIM Bank   790MW Dokhatawady River 
           Central China Power Grid Co.      
           CITC        
   Lembro       Department of Hydropower Planning     
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   Saing Pin       ditto        
                    
   Hutgyi    1  Sinohydro    1360MW Salween River 
                    
   Mytsone    3.6  SPIC (State Power Investment Corp) 6000MW Ayeyarwady River 
                    
   Bu-ywa       Guanong New Technology Import & Eport 60MW   
                    
   Shwell River   0.15  Yunnan Joint Development Corp.  1420MW   
                    
   Veywa            790MW   
                              
               
 (Source) Prepared by the author based on Mizuno 2012, McDonald, Bosshard, Brewer 2008, and other sources     
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(Table 3) Net ODA flows to Myanmar and Vietnam        
   (annual amount in average, million US dollars)      
                         
     Myanmar              Vietnam     
  Bilateral: OECD-DAC Multilateral Total Bilatelal: OECD-DAC Multilatelal Total 
1980-84   201.3   96.2    297.5    106.2    55.1    161.3  
                          
1985-89   244.8    110.0    354.8    70.9    53.7    124.6  
                          
1990-94   98.4    47.3    145.7    305.4    128.1    433.5  
                          
1995-99   53.5    18.0    71.5    667.0    396.8    1063.8  
                          
             (Source) OECD, various issues           
Abstract (in Japanese) 
要約
援助を受け入れる途上国は、長年の間、不平等な交渉力を余儀なくされる伝統的ド
ナー・レシピエント関係（援助の出し手と受け手の関係）に苦しんできた。本稿は、
非伝統的な支援国である新興ドナーの力を利用することによって、援助受入国がこの
不平等状態から脱却できる可能性を追及するものである。伝統的なドナー・レシピエ
ント関係の変革が２段階で発生することを、標準的な合理的選択理論と詳細な事例分
析によって示したい。 
資金流入の規模をできるだけ大きくすることは、援助受入国にとっての一つの目標
である。援助受入国が国際社会で支配的な開発規範を受容する限り、資金流入とくに
援助資金流入は保証される。なお開発規範は、通常、OECD-DAC加盟国による援助の経
済的・政治的条件（コンディショナリティ）として提示される。援助受入国には二通
りの行動選択肢がある。国際社会の開発規範を受容するか受容しないかの二つである。
もし援助受入国が、彼らの原則に合致しないとして開発規範を受容しない場合には、
援助が停止される可能性があり、海外直接投資（FDI）など援助以外の資金フローも、
経済制裁のために流入しなくなる可能性がある。しかしながらその場合でも、援助受
入国は新興ドナーからの資金フローを確保することが可能であろう。新興ドナーは通
常、国際開発規範に関心を持たないからである。 
新興ドナーからの資金フローが確保されれば、援助受入国にとっての次の課題は、
何らかの方法によって伝統的な援助国からの資金フローを確保し、資金流入量を増加
させて自らのおかれた状況を改善することである。そこで考えられる一つの解決策は、
伝統的な援助国との間での「相互の妥協」である。いいかえれば、双方がそれぞれの
原則を可能な範囲で貫きながらも、受入国側は国際開発規範を部分的に受入れ、伝統
的な援助国の側は資金フローを部分的に再開することである。伝統的な援助国にとっ
て援助受入国の市場や資源が魅力的であれば、この方法が実現する可能性がある。伝
統的な援助国は、新興ドナーが受入国の市場や資源を独占している現状に懸念を持つ
であろうし、彼ら自身も市場や資源にアクセスしたいと意欲を持つであろうから。伝
統的な援助国と援助受入国は、相互の妥協によって、つまり相手方の原則を部分的に
認めることによって、それぞれの置かれた状況を改善することができる。 
このようなプロセスは、まさにミャンマーで発生したことであり、その過程で中国
が決定的な役割をはたした。ミャンマーで起きたことの詳細な事例分析は、一般の援
助受入国が新興ドナーを「テコ」として利用することによって、どのように「交渉力
の非対称」を克服できるかを明らかにする。他の途上国がミャンマーの経験からヒン
トを引き出すことによって、非対称的なドナー・レシピエント関係の下でも、交渉力
31 
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を強化することが望まれる。 
 
キーワード: ドナー・レシピエント関係（援助の出し手と受け手の関係）、選択肢（選
択可能な行動）、選択の結果としての効用、交渉力を強める「テコ」の作用、新興ド
ナー 
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